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Stephanie Hicks

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE'S MEMORANDUM BRIEF RE:

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ALLEGED DEATH PENALTY

The State of Arizona, by and through Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County Attorney, and her deputy undersigned, hereby submits its Memorandum Brief re: Probable Cause for the

The State has alleged the following statutory aggravating circumstances according to A.R.S. § 13-7031 and has presented evidence supporting probable cause for each aggravator at

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¹ Renumbered as A.R.S. § 13-751 effective January 1, 2009. All references in this pleading are to the statutes effective in 2008.

² State v. Chronis, 220 Ariz. 559, 208 P.3d 210 (2009)(a defendant has a right to a probable cause determination for alleged death penalty aggravators).

A. 13-703(F)(2):

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), one of the factors considered "an aggravating circumstance in determining whether to impose a sentence of death" is where a "defendant has been or was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether preparatory or completed. Convictions for serious offenses committed on the same occasion as the homicide ... shall be treated as a serious offense under this paragraph. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(I)(9), Burglary in the First Degree is a serious offense.

On October 31, 2008, the Yavapai County grand jury found probable cause to believe that Defendant committed Burglary in the First Degree; that is he entered and remained in Carol Kennedy's residence located at 7485 Bridal Path, Prescott, AZ unlawfully with intent to kill Carol while he was armed with a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument, to-wit: a golf club. The case was subsequently remanded for a new finding of probable cause and on February 5, 2009, a different grand jury again found probable cause to believe the same. Because the *Chronis* requirement regarding the (F)(2) aggravator was met at grand jury, the State asked the Court to take judicial notice of the grand jury's findings.

B. <u>13-703(F)(5):</u>

"Under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5), a first degree murder is aggravated if the homicide was committed 'as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value." *State v. Martinez*, 218 Ariz. 421, 435, 189 P.3d 348, 435 (2008). "Specifically, the state must prove that pecuniary gain was a 'motive, cause or impetus for the murder and not merely the result." *State v. Canez*, 202 Ariz. 133, 159, 42 P.3d 564, 590 (2002) (quoting *State v. Kayer*, 194 Ariz. 423, 433, 984 P.2d 31, 41 (1999)); *see also Moormann v. Schriro*, 426 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). "This proof may be

either by 'tangible evidence or strong circumstantial inference.'" *Canez* at 159, 42 P.3d 564, 590 (quoting *State v. Hyde*, 186 Ariz. 252, 280, 921 P.2d 655, 683 (1996)). In this case, there is ample evidence that Carol's murder was motivated by Defendant's desire for pecuniary gain.

The State presented evidence that Defendant was a senior financial advisor who, in the months before the murder, had seen his compensation drop dramatically, nearly 30%, although his expenditures had not. The State presented evidence that Defendant was "upside down" in debt, could not meet his financial obligations and had no liquid assets other than his 401K. The State demonstrated that in 2007 Defendant had a net cash shortage of \$170,000 and a net cash shortage of over \$100,000 in the first six months of 2008. The State presented evidence that in early 2008, Defendant was forced to borrow \$50,000 from his family just to make ends meet. Simply stated, Defendant was living far beyond his means.

The State also presented evidence that Carol had placed additional financial pressure upon Defendant in the weeks before her death. The State introduced evidence that Carol stated she was unable to find a lender willing to transfer the second mortgage on the Bridal Path residence into her name. Equally important is the fact that Carol did not have the financial resources to maintain the two mortgages on the property. As a result, Carol told her daughters that she was going to walk away from the property and allow it to go into foreclosure. With the real estate market conditions in free fall at that time, and because Defendant was still listed as a responsible party on the mortgages, he would have either been forced into a short-sale or foreclosure, either of which would have placed even more financial pressure on Defendant and would have caused additional damage to his already perilous financial condition.

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More importantly, just hours before her death and in response to Defendant's request for his potion of the liquidation from the UBS 401K³, Carol placed even more financial pressure on Defendant. Defendant emailed Carol at 11:02 p.m. on July 1, 2008, demanding that Carol deliver to him \$8,683.68⁴ and told her that without those funds, he could not pay her the \$6,000 spousal support payment for July. Carol emailed back insisting that Defendant would receive nothing from the 401K and that she was going to apply his portion of the significantly reduced overage⁵ to the past due amount he owed on one of the credit cards⁶. Carol informed Defendant that he still owed her \$2,491.48 for the past due amount on the credit card in addition to the \$6,000 monthly spousal support and that she expected payment for both immediately.

With Carol's death, Defendant escaped paying Carol the nearly \$8,500 he owed her at the time. With Carol's death, Defendant also escaped paying her an additional \$564,000 in spousal support payments. Additionally, if Defendant had not been suspected and eventually arrested for Carol's brutal murder, he, acting as an agent for his daughters, certainly would have had access and control over Carol's life insurance policies, which had a combined value of \$750,000.

³ The Decree ordered that if the 401K QDRO was over \$180,000.00 the parties would evenly split the remainder.

⁴On May, 28, 2009, the value of the 401K was \$197,367.36; however the distributed amount was only \$186,667.31.

⁵Carol calculated the overage on the 401K after taxes would be \$3,867.04. Defendant's half was \$1,933.52.

⁶ Prior to the final decree, Defendant was to keep current the payments to a Chase credit card. He failed to do so and on the date of the Decree, the Chase account had a past due amount of \$4,425.00

Defendant was broke and by his own admission could not afford to make the \$6,000 spousal support payment which was due on July 1, 2008. He needed Carol to agree to terms as outlined in his July 1, 11:02 p.m. email. When she did not, Defendant brutally beat her to death. These facts demonstrate adequate probable cause to believe that Defendant murdered Carol for pecuniary gain. The State has satisfied the *Chronis* requirement for the (F)(5) aggravator.

C. <u>13-703(F)(6)</u>:

"Under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), a first degree murder is aggravated when '[t]he defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." *State v. Martinez*, 218 Ariz. 421, 435, 189 P.3d 348, 362 (2008). The "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravator is written in the disjunctive, and the State need prove only one of the three to trigger application of the aggravating circumstance. *Martinez* at 435, 189 P.3d at 362; *State v. Gretzler*, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983).

In *State v. Knapp*, 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court set forth the following definition: "cruel: disposed to inflict pain esp. in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner, sadistic." Later, when the (F)(6) aggravator was challenged as unconstitutionally vague, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the following language contained sufficiently specific instruction regarding cruelty to foreclose the challenge:

Cruelty goes to mental and physical anguish suffered by the victim. Mental anguish occurs when the victim experiences significant uncertainty about her fate. In order to constitute cruelty, conduct must occur before death and while victim is conscious. Conduct occurring after death or while a victim is unconscious does not constitute cruelty. Before conduct can be

found to be cruel, the State must prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the conduct would cause suffering to the victim.

State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 189, 119 P.3d 448, 456 (2005).

"Cruelty exists if the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur. Mental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty about [his] ultimate fate." State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 123, ¶ 48, 211 P.3d 684, 693 (2009) (citations omitted); see also State v. Tucker 215 Ariz. 298, 160 P.3d 177 (2007). Only where there is no evidence that the victim suffered physical or mental pain or the evidence is inconclusive have Arizona courts held that cruelty was not shown. Getzler at 51, 659 P.2d at 10; see also State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 534, 622 P.2d 478, 481 (1981); State v. Ceja, 126 Ariz. 35, 39, 612 P.2d 491, 495 (1980); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 210, 639 P.2d 1020, 1035 (1977).

Former Yavapai County Medical Examiner Dr. Keen testified that Carol had multiple blunt force injuries and that her death was caused independently or in aggregate by any of the seven depressed fractures to her skull. Dr. Keen testified that Carol would have seen her attacker. Dr. Keen stated that the injuries to Carol's right forearm were consistent with defensive wounds. The two defensive-type injuries to Carol's forearm were rod-like in shape and consistent with the shaft of a golf club. Dr. Keen testified that the rod-like injuries to the right forearm in addition to an expanded bruising on Carol's right triceps area which was about the dimension and shape of a golf club head led him to believe those injuries were caused by a golf club. Dr. Keen stated that he did not believe the injuries to the forearm and triceps were inflicted after Carol was unconscious because, based upon his experience, it is highly unlikely that the arm of an unconscious person would remain flexed in the manner

Carol's was at the time of the injury. Dr. Keen stated that the defensive injuries would have been extremely painful and would have caused mental anguish and suffering due to the viciousness of the attack. One can clearly envision the horror, fear and anguish Carol experienced when Defendant, the person with whom Carol had spent the majority of her adult life, began beating her mercilessly with a golf club.

Dr. Keen believed Carol had been struck in the face at least twice and that these blows were non-fatal and delivered before Carol's death. Carol's nose had been broken, both of her eyes were blackened, she had been struck in the mouth, and had abrasions to her lower right chin. Dr. Keen testified there were complex fractures to the facial bones and that the fracture to the nose caused some of the facial bones to become dislodged from the base of the front of the skull. In addition, there was a severe laceration to the left side of Carol's forehead. Dr. Keen stated that the laceration could have been caused by forceful contact with the corner of the desk in the room where Carol was found⁷. Dr. Keen opined that Carol was conscious and alert for at least three of the blows to her head and face. Dr. Keen also testified that any reasonable person would have known that the blows caused significant pain and suffering.

Dr. Keen stated that in addition to the facial injuries, Carol had at least 8 distinct injuries to both sides, the top, and the back of her skull. Many of these were comminuted fractures, that is fractures that have complexity in the way they fracture. Dr. Keen compared a comminuted fracture to the effect on a boiled egg when it is dropped – there is a shattered appearance rather that a straight-line cut. Seven were also depressed fractures, meaning the

⁷ Photographs of the crime scene showed that the corner of the desk was covered in blood.

bone invaded the brain tissue. Dr. Keen testified that at least two of the fractures had a curved nature which was consistent with the head of a golf club.

Dr. Keen testified he believed Carol was beaten from all sides. Dr. Keen stated that because the laceration to the scalp and fractures to the skull were so severe, the blows causing them had to be both violent and vicious. Dr. Keen testified that unlike in most autopsies he performed he did not have to use a saw to open the cranial vault because Carol's skull was already shattered into so many pieces. Dr. Keen stated that once the brain was removed, he noted numerous fractures to the base of the skull which was yet another indication of the severity of the impacts. Dr. Keen testified that very massive blows from above are needed to fracture the base of the skull. Clearly, the State has offered significant evidence that Carol was murdered in an especially cruel manner. She saw her attacker, had defensive wounds, and received at least two vicious and violent blows to her face and head before she lost consciousness. The *Chronis* requirement for cruelty has been met.

A "factor we have found to demonstrate a heinous or depraved state of mind is the infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim." *State v. Gretzler*, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983).

We think that defendant's conduct in continuing his barrage of violence, inflicting wounds and abusing his victims, beyond the point necessary to fulfill his plan to steal, beyond even the point necessary to kill, is such an additional circumstance of a * * * depraved nature so as to set it apart from the "usual or the norm." 126 Ariz. at 40, 612 P.2d at 496, quoting *State v. Ceja*, supra, 115 Ariz. at 417, 565 P.2d at 1278.

Gretzler, at 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983).

Gratuitous violence "may be demonstrated by the continued infliction of violence after the defendant knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred." State v.

Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, ¶ 52, 211 P.3d 684, 694 (2009). In State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 281, 921 P.2d 655, 684 (1996), the defendant beat his victim on the head with a Bowie knife until the bone was visible and the victim was bleeding profusely. The Arizona Supreme Court held "that defendant's repetitive bludgeoning of both victims was an act of gratuitous violence."

The bludgeoning continued after both victims were dead with their skulls shattered from the force of the repeated blows. ... In both cases, the blows were delivered with sufficient force not only to shatter the bone but to cut and tear the brain tissue by forcing the bone fragments into it.

Id.

The injuries to the victims in *Hyde* are markedly similar to Carol's. Dr. Keen testified that any of the blows which caused bone to be depressed into the brain could have caused unconsciousness and death and that one was probably delivered relatively early in the attack. Carol's scalp was visibly laid open such that the bones of the skull were exposed in many of the photos taken at the scene. Dr. Keen testified that he could not determine the order in which the blows were delivered. Dr. Keen also testified that because any of the depressed fractures could have caused Carol to lose consciousness, Carol's attacker continued to beat her after she became defenseless.

There is evidence that after killing Carol, Defendant staged the room to make it appear as though she had died as the result of a fall. A ladder was placed in front of the door just inches from where Carol was found. When Carol's body was first moved by law enforcement, a large pool of blood was found underneath her stomach, although Carol had no injuries to that part of her body. This gives reason to believe that Carol's head first hit the floor at that location. There was a severe laceration on Carol's forehead which was consistent with a blow from a sharp surface such as the corner of the desk. The corner of the

desk was covered in Carol's blood. A potion of the corner of the desk had broken off and was found under Carol's head. There is reason to believe that the blow was delivered after Carol was unconscious, when Defendant purposefully smashed Carol's head into the desk to support the accidental fall scenario.

The State has satisfied the *Chronis* requirement by demonstrating there is probable cause to believe that Defendant inflicted wounds and abused Carol far beyond the point necessary to kill. The repeated vicious, violent blows to Carol's head with a golf club, many of which were delivered after she was unconscious, and the deliberate smashing of Carol's face and head into the corner of the desk in an attempt to make it appear that Carol has died as a result of an accident show that Defendant committed this murder in an especially depraved manner.

D. <u>13-703(F)(12):</u>

In 2005, A.R.S. § 13-703(F) was amended to include three additional aggravating circumstances for the trier of fact to consider in determining whether to impose a sentence of death. Included was whether a "defendant committed the offense to prevent person's cooperation with an official law enforcement investigation, to prevent a person's testimony in a court proceeding, in retaliation for a person's cooperation with an official law enforcement investigation or in retaliation for a person's testimony in a court proceeding." A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(12). Prior to the enactment of (F)(12), an allegation that a defendant killed a witness to prevent or in retaliation for a person's cooperation or testimony was typically a factor given some weight in proving the (F)(6) aggravator. Although there is no Arizona case law which examines the (F)(12) aggravator, we do have benefit of cases prior to the enactment of (F)(12) which define the standard of proof required to show witness elimination was a motive.

In *State v. Ross*, 180 Ariz. 598, 886 P.2d 1354 (1994), the Arizona Supreme Court stated:

The evidence supporting a finding of witness elimination has, under our cases, taken one of three forms. First is where the murder victim is the witness to some other crime, and is killed to prevent that person from testifying about the other crime. A second kind of evidence of witness elimination is a statement by the defendant that witness elimination is a motive for the murder. The final kind of evidence is where extraordinary circumstances of the crime show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that witness elimination is a motive.

Id at 606, 886 P.2d at 1362 (emphasis added).

The State presented evidence that Defendant submitted false financial information to the court during divorce proceedings and submitted the same false information to the Internal Revenue Service when he filed his 2007 tax return. The State's financial forensic expert, Richard Echols, testified that Defendant inflated his expenses and undervalued his assets on his Amended Financial Affidavit provided to the divorce court on February 1, 2008. Mr. Echols testified that Defendant used the same inaccurate figures when he filed his 2007 income tax return. The State presented evidence that Carol planned on taking Defendant back to court regarding the divorce decree to get some of the inequities resolved. Carol's own tax return, which had not yet been filed when she was murdered, would have contained figures which contradicted those on Defendant's return. Upon filing of Carol's return, Defendant's own tax return would have been automatically subjected to scrutiny by the IRS. Furthermore, Carol had threatened to report Defendant to the IRS for filing a fraudulent income tax return. Conviction on either lying to the court or tax fraud would have cost Defendant his stock trader's license and his ability to work as a financial advisor.

These facts establish probable cause to believe that one of Defendant's motives for killing Carol was to prevent her from revealing his lies to both the divorce court and to the IRS. The State has met the *Chronis* requirement for the (F)(12) aggravator.

E. <u>13-703(F)(13):</u>

As with the (F)(12) aggravator, (F)(13) was added as a statutory aggravator in 2005 and provides that a trier of fact can consider whether a murder "was committed in a cold, calculated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification." Throughout the various hearings in this case, the Court has received sufficient circumstantial evidence to believe that Defendant ambushed Carol. A carefully prearranged plan to commit premeditated murder is committed in a cold and calculated manner. *Smith v. Florida*, 7 So.3d 473, 491 (2009).

Defendant was well aware of Carol's habit of running near her home after work most evenings. Defendant knew Carol would be home alone that evening since their daughter Katie had just recently left the country. More importantly, Carol had sent a text message to Defendant the afternoon of July 2, 2008, stating he could come out that evening to pick up Katie's car. Defendant said nothing of this plan to either his daughter Charlotte or Charlotte's boyfriend Jacob. There is evidence that Defendant entered the home from the ranch land directly behind the home, after he stashed his bicycle in the brush, while Carol was out on her evening run and, once in the house, laid in wait for her to return. Defendant also knew there was a golf club at the residence because he had left it there for Carol's upcoming garage sale. Dr. Keen testified that Carol's injuries were consistent with those that could be caused by a golf club.

The staging of the scene is another indication of the cold, calculated manner in which Carol's murder was carried out. As stated in the (F)(6) potion of this pleading, there is reason

to believe the laceration on Carol's forehead was delivered after Carol was unconscious, when Defendant purposefully smashed her head into the desk to support the accidental fall scenario. These facts establish probable cause to believe Defendant committed Carol's murder in a cold, calculated manner.

CONCLUSION:

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The grand jury found probable cause to believe Defendant committed Burglary in the First Degree in order to kill Carol. At the *Chronis* Hearing, the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe Defendant brutally murdered Carol for pecuniary gain and to prevent her from reopening the divorce case and turning him in to the IRS. The State also presented sufficient evidence that the murder was committed in a cruel and depraved manner as well as a cold, calculated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 November, 2009.

By

Sheila Sullivan Polk
YAVAPAI/COUNTY ATTORNEY

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Joseph C. Butner
Deputy County Attorney

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	3	COPIES of the foregoing delivered this day of November, 2009 to:
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	5	Division 6
	6	Yavapai County Superior Court (via email)
		(Via ciliair)
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